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Abstract
This chapter compares the historical development and use of criminal law at work in the United
Kingdom and in Ontario, Canada. Speci cally, it considers the use of the criminal law both in the
master and servant regime as an instrument for disciplining the workforce and in factory legislation
for protecting workers from unhealthy and unsafe working conditions, including exceedingly long
hours work. Master and servant legislation that criminalized servant breaches of contract originated in
the United Kingdom where it was widely used in the nineteenth century to discipline industrial
workers. These laws were partially replicated in Ontario, where it had shallower roots and was used
less aggressively. At the same time as the use of criminal law to enforce master and servant law was
contested, legislatures in the United Kingdom and Ontario enacted protective factory acts limiting the
length of the working day. However, these factory acts did not treat employer violations crimes;
instead, they were treated as lesser ‘regulatory’ o ences for which employers were rarely prosecuted.

Keywords: master and servant laws, Factory Acts, United Kingdom, Ontario, Canada, labour law, criminal
sanctions, regulatory o ences, enforcement
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23 Class Crimes: Master and Servant Laws and Factories
Acts in Industrializing Britain and (Ontario) Canada 

A. Introduction
Historically, labour and employment law has played both a disciplinary and a protective function. In pre1

modern England, the precursors to master and servant law ful lled both these functions. The disciplinary
face compelled work for those without their own means of support and enforced obedience and e ort
through the threat of criminal sanctions. By contrast, the protective face provided workers with a summary
civil mechanism to enforce their right to be paid. This asymmetry was deeply rooted in the social relations
of a declining feudal regime, which inscribed the subordination of servants into a legal regime that
2

required the ruling elite to call upon the state to enforce their traditional prerogative or ‘police’ powers.

Thus from an historical institutionalist perspective, the criminalization of employee breaches of the duty to
obey might be seen as a path-dependent response to the challenges posed by the weakening of feudalism at
3

a time when other means of contract enforcement were neither available nor feasible. Criminalization of
employer breaches of contract to strengthen worker protection, however, was inconceivable in the early
modern era of English history. Industrial capitalism arose from this legal foundation, but operated in a
di erent environment in which employers still sought to discipline wage workers through criminal
sanctions and in which trade unionists and their supporters attempted to criminalize employers who
endangered the lives and health of factory children.
We start our story of criminality at work in England’s rst industrial revolution not from a normative view
of the appropriate scope of the criminal law but from a historical perspective that builds on an analysis of
institutions, ideologies and, ultimately, class struggles over the construction of control and protective
regimes at work. As industrial capitalism and its attendant ideology of freedom to contract reached its
p. 456

apogee in nineteenth century

England, both the status relations of superiority and subordination and the

paternalistic bonds of reciprocity of the old social order, upon which the law of master and servant was
4

based, were disrupted. Our focus is on how the coercive control of workers through master and servant law,
on the one hand, and attempts to restrict and penalize masters’ exploitation of economically subordinated
workers through the factories acts, on the other, played out. We also add a comparative dimension to this
analysis through an examination of English and Canadian (Ontario) developments so we can examine
di erences in historical trajectories, institutional structures, and social and class contexts, and thereby
illuminate their e ects on legal developments.
We begin with a brief foray into recent criminal law theorizing that illuminates its deep ambiguities
5

regarding the scope of criminalization and then recount the stories of master and servant and factory law
on parallel tracks, returning to a comparison only in the conclusion.
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classi ed them as members of patriarchal households but which, under the stress of the Black Death,

B. The Role and Function of the Criminal Law
The notion that there is a neat conceptual or normative divide between wrongs that are mala in se or
criminal and mala in prohibitum or regulatory o ences has given way to the recognition that the distinction
between ‘true’ and ‘regulatory’ crimes is ambiguous. The changing role of the state from its traditional
focus on protecting the sovereign and political order to its modern concern with protecting and regulating
6

the civil order and social life is a major reason for this ambiguity. This shift occurred during the transition
from a feudal to a capitalist social formation, which itself entailed the sharpening of the boundary between
7

from the political order. A crucial dimension of this transition was the sweeping away of status-based
relations that privileged a landed aristocracy whose authority was rooted in the patriarchal political order
and the institutionalization of new hierarchies rooted in a privatized civil and economic order that
privileged an emerging bourgeoisie.
This economic and industrial revolution not only undermined the traditional social order but also social
reproduction, the daily and generational reproduction of human and social life, by unshackling the
traditional restraints on exploitation and undoing the paternalistic bonds of reciprocity. As households lost
direct access to land that provided them with subsistence, family members, including young children, were
8

forced to sell their labour power on the market to survive. In this context, a movement to construct a
protective regime emerged.
p. 457

Simultaneously, the breakdown of the hierarchical order and traditional patterns of work required the
creation of a disciplinary regime suited to the new factory order, which required workers to work by the
9

clock and obey the command of the overseer. However, unlike the construction of a protective regime,
which had to start nearly from scratch, the disciplinary regime could build on the old master and servant
law.
Criminal law was central to both these projects. In part, this was an historical necessity. The early
nineteenth century English state lacked a developed administrative capacity and relied heavily, if not
exclusively, on the criminal law as a mechanism of rule. Nicola Lacey points to the undisputed increase in
the statutory creation of summary o ences in the nineteenth century, but notes its even earlier use to
10

enforce employment contracts.

This expansion, however, was contested and con ict intensi ed over the

course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Using the criminal law against subordinate
classes was deeply rooted and widespread, although tempered by mercy, and reliance on local magistrates,
11

appointed from local elites, reinforced traditional hierarchies.

So while prosecuting absconding and

recalcitrant workers in local courts built on the existing edi ce of criminal law, imprisoning workers for
breach of contract was increasingly viewed as inconsistent with free labour and freedom of contract. Using
the criminal law against masters to enforce protective laws was another matter. Was the gross exploitation
of child labour a threat to the social order truly deserving of criminal punishment or was it a lesser wrong,
merely an excess in what was otherwise the noble activity of pro t maximization and private wealth
creation?
These questions set o

a decades long debate and contributed to a reconstruction of the criminal law that

allowed for re nements between wrongdoing that was truly criminal (mala in se), requiring mens rea, and
legal violations considered to be merely regulatory o ences (mala prohibitum), which were strict liability
12

and outcome based.

The resulting ‘conventionalization of factory crime’ helped resolve the legitimation

problems facing England’s rulers who felt compelled to respond to the most dysfunctional consequences of
the rst industrial revolution without at the same time treating as true criminals the powerful economic
13

actors who were responsible for and who bene tted nancially from these harms.

‘In doing so’, according

to Lacey, ‘the Victorian legislature further embedded an elusive distinction between “real” and

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/36923/chapter/322198887 by York University Libraries user on 18 October 2022

the political and the economic and the public and the private, in e ect creating a civil order that was distinct

“regulatory” crime—the latter realized through a parallel system of summary jurisdiction generally
14

focused on outcome responsibility—which haunts English criminal law to this day’.

p. 458

C. Master and Servant Law: Disciplining Workers
1. England
villeinage or serfdom, which were incorporated into the rst labourers statutes of the fourteenth century
and later into the Elizabethan Statute of Arti cers. However, by the mid-eighteenth century the general
15

understanding was that the Statute of Arti cers had little or no application to industrial workers.

Speci c

groups of masters brought petitions to Parliament for legislation to address questions about the types of
workers covered by the disciplinary system and to extend its scope over a broader range of workers and
16

types of conduct. Beginning in 1747 Parliament began enacting a new series of master and servants acts.

Unlike their forebears, the new master and servant laws ‘[were] not an attempt to maintain in place a preindustrial model of household employment. Instead, [they] aimed to impose a more rigorous system of
work discipline on growing numbers of labourers, artisans and outworkers employed in manufacturing, as
17

well as maintaining control of the agricultural labour market at a time of considerable upheaval.’

These

laws granted employers the right to compel speci c performance of employment contracts and to discipline
18

reluctant workers with sanctions that included whipping and imprisonment.

At the same time, the laws

abolished the paternalistic bonds of reciprocity including the wage-setting machinery of the Elizabethan
19

statute.

The law also terminated the system of poor law settlements to mobilize labour supply and shift
20

the labour market towards freedom of contract and away from traditional ethical constraints.

However, the gradual embrace of freedom of contract did not mean that workers were free to quit their
employment. Penal master and servant law became ‘increasingly criminal in character’ in the nineteenth
century with the increasing carceral capacity and technologies—police, the arrest warrant, and prisons—of
21

the central state.

Not only was the use of coercive criminal law seen as necessary to uphold the ‘sanctity of

contract’, ‘the criminalization of workers’ unruliness through master and servant law was consistent with a
22

belief in the criminal inclinations of the propertyless’.

While freedom of contract and economic laissez

faire went hand in hand with industrial capitalism, in the realm of employment it could not deliver what
23

employers wanted—virtually unfettered prerogatives combined with the workers’ duty to obey.

The

restrictive and coercive master and servant law provided the juridical basis for the duty to obey that is
implied by law into every contract of employment distinguishing the legal relationship as one involving a
24

‘not free contract but a hierarchical model of service’.
p. 459

In 1823, Parliament extended and strengthened the coercive edge of the master and servant law, using
25

‘broad language that could be read to cover the overwhelming majority of manual wage workers’.

It also

established new crimes for workers, who could be charged by their employers for leaving work without
notice or before the agreement expired, for refusing to begin contracted work, for being absent without
permission, for performing work negligently or poorly, or for committing some broadly de ned form of
26

misbehaviour.

Workers therefore were bound to service for the duration of their initial agreements, which

were prima facie a year in length. By contrast, workers were only entitled to sue their employers for failure
to pay agreed-upon wages, dismissal without proper notice, or abuse.
Moreover, court procedure was much more favourable to employers than to workers. Most disputes under
master and servant law were subject to the summary jurisdiction of local magistrates’ courts or petty
sessions, known as ‘police courts’, although the process and punishment for masters and servants di ered
greatly. Servants faced criminal charges and were commonly arrested by constables pursuant to arrest
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In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, master and servant laws built upon medieval notions of

27

warrants.

As a criminal defendant, a worker could not be a witness in her or his own defence. Workers

appeared before a single magistrate and if convicted penalties included a ne, the posting of a surety for
completion of the contract, or up to three months in prison at hard labour. If the court terminated the
28

contract, the worker lost all claims to outstanding wages.

However, imprisonment for breach of contract

did not automatically terminate the contract, and, if the contract was not cancelled, a worker who refused to
29

re-enter service could be prosecuted again.

Masters, on the other hand, only faced civil liability, liable to pay up to £10 in back wages. If successful
workers could be released from their contracts, but since court costs were to be paid by the loser, workers
unsuccessful. Moreover, employers could readily appeal the civil judgments against them, while workers
had great di

culty in appealing their convictions and had to obtain a writ of habeas corpus to get out of

30

prison.

Not only was the content of the law biased against workers, by the end of the second quarter of the
31

nineteenth century, in many regions so too was its administration.

The justices of the peace who oversaw

petty sessions were generally either county magistrates on a circuit or borough magistrates whose social
composition shifted in the early to mid-nineteenth century from landed gentry and the clergy to
32

industrialists and their sympathetic professional allies.

Thus, magistrates were increasingly likely to be

employers themselves, with an interest in the outcome of the dispute they tried. Although legally required
to recuse themselves when cases came before the bench involving potential con icts of interests, such as
adjudicating a dispute within their own industries, magistrates were not monitored and rarely stepped
aside. Moreover, even on the rare occasions when a magistrate did recuse himself, another from within the
p. 460

33

same social and political networks likely replaced him.

The appearance that employers were judges in

their own cause fuelled a great sense of grievance by workers and their unions, as is illustrated by the
following complaint from a potters’ union periodical from the mid-nineteenth century:
He, as we have before stated, who would administer the law from vindictive, or class-regulated
feelings, is a villain, and ought to be subject to some heavy, penal enactment. The judge who would
act from passion, prejudice, or class interest, and not from the letter of the law, is a blot on
jurisprudence of a country,—a moral pestilence in the very heart of social existence, that threatens
the security of life, liberty, and property; and ought, consequently, to be removed, as the greatest
34

possible evil of civilized society.

This appearance of class bias in the administration of master and servant law undermined its legitimacy.
35

During the 1840s trade unions and Chartists attacked master and servant law and the lay magistracy.

The

language of Chartism was ideally suited to address the injustice of master and servant law; criminalizing
workers’ breach of contract while treating employers’ failure to ful l agreements as civil matters
exempli ed class legislation, which Chartists argued was inevitable if workers were unable to play a role
36

either in legislating or administering justice.

Unions and Chartists argued that employment contracts

should be treated as all other contracts and, therefore, not liable to criminal enforcement. However, during
the 1840s the more commonly used argument was that the enforcement of master and servant law ‘by lay
magistrates drawn increasingly from the class of industrial employers, who were often indi erent to legal
37

formalities, represented a serious threat to the liberty of the subject’.

Unions retained barristers to challenge convictions in the high courts on the basis of technicalities and
several appeals were successful. The leading union barrister was WP Roberts, whose constant refrain was
that untrained magistrates were violating the constitution in their administration of the master and servant
38

law.

The high courts had much more legitimacy for unions and their allies than the summary powers of
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risked owing their employer an amount equivalent a good part of a week’s wages if their suit was

magistrates. In an article titled ‘Constitutional Law against Coal King Law: Good News for the Miners,’ the
Chartist journal the Northern Star reported on 23 December 1843:
that while our readers are struck with the horrible picture we have drawn of ‘club law’, they will
rejoice to nd that in the Real Law there is yet protection for the poor. To get the law is the thing,
and Mr. Roberts appears to have discovered the magical process by which this desideratum is to be
39

achieved.
p. 461

By the mid-nineteenth century, trade union lawyers were making life increasingly uncomfortable for

Political opposition to master and servant law rallied against a bill, introduced by three Tory backbenchers
in February 1844, designed to extend the scope of master and servant law to all wage employment with the
40

exception of domestic service.

During the spring of 1844, Chartists, trade unionists, and short-time
41

committees throughout England and Wales launched a large campaign against the bill.

Short-time

committees that had been established to support Lord Ashley’s ten-hour bill, which, as we will see, limited
working hours for women and children in factories, held large rallies to oppose the coercive master and
servant bill and advocate for protective factory legislation. Speakers often used the same language for both
42

that emphasized masculine citizenship and the necessity of ‘protecting our women and children’.

The

suggestion that the master and servant bill presented new dangers to women, who were characterized as
‘less than free agents’ and, as such, especially vulnerable, was incorrect, as women were already covered
43

and had been prosecuted under master and servant law.

Objection to the 1844 bill was also tied to support

for the jury, even though jury members were unlikely to be peers of workers. This concerted opposition
defeated the expansion of the criminal law to force workers to labour.
Parliament put a stop to trade union lawyers’ strategy of appealing magistrates’ decisions to the high courts
for technical defects. In 1848 and 1849 the Jervis Acts, named for the Attorney General who sponsored them,
were passed, which settled the form and procedures that magistrates were bound to follow, while
44

preserving their discretion in respect of many matters.

This legislation, combined with changing priorities

of the Queen’s Bench, including a hardening attitude to labour unrest, made it much more di

cult for

45

labour’s legal representatives to challenge magistrates’ rulings.

Not only did the ‘taint of criminality’ spread throughout master and servant act proceedings during the
46

nineteenth century, the disciplinary function of the law also increased.

Although the proportion of

workers sentenced to penal sanctions was never large compared with the number of employment contracts,
47

prosecutions were exemplary.

In the preceding century, the ratio of wage recovery cases to employee
48

discipline cases was nearly equal, or even more favourable to workers in some cases.

Yet, by the 1860s,

employers were responsible for two-thirds of the master and servant cases and in many regions magistrates
49

began to hand down heavier sentences.

Employers’ increasing resort to coercive law re ected the growth

in industrial employment; manufacturing and mining represented over 30 per cent of the workforce in 1811
p. 462

50

and over 40 per cent in 1851.

Employers used the

law in a wide variety of industries, including

shipbuilding, bottle making, iron moulding, brickmaking, hardware and cutlery, mining, cabinet making,
the leather trades, and the building trades. The law could be an e ective weapon against strikes by skilled
workers who had strategic power in the production process and to enforce labour discipline in low-wage
industries where turnover, absenteeism, and low productivity could be a problem in the absence of other
51

means of sanctioning, supervision, or control.

However, the extent to which the law was used and its
52

coerciveness depended on local cultures of work and social relations.

For example, the greatest use of

master and servant law was in the places that witnessed the largest transfusions of mine owners,
53

ironmasters, and textile manufacturers to the magisterial bench.
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employers and magistrates by discrediting the penal law.

54

In 1867, the master and servant law was partially reformed.

Symbolically, the law moved away from the

criminal law and remedied some of the most egregious procedural inequalities. Fines became the standard
punishment for breach of contract, the possibility of damage payments to employers was added and
55

imprisonment was limited to cases of ‘aggravated’ o ences on the part of workers.

Conviction required

the presence of two magistrates, and workers could testify on their own behalf. But, at the same time, the
1867 reform allowed a magistrate to order an employee to return to work and provided for deductions from
wages for breach of contract even if no civil claim for damages could have arisen. Although these changes
were associated with a decrease in the fraction of prosecutions ending in a direct sentence of imprisonment,
and an increase in the fraction of prosecutions resulting in a ne, imprisonment was the outcome for those
master and servant law, re ected: ‘I have always found that the employers care little about the money,
56

about getting actual compensation, and that they wanted labour.’

The Master and Servant Act 1867 was
57

much used; in fact, ‘[t]he largest number of convictions was recorded in the last years of the law’.

The repeal in 1875 of the Master and Servant Act 1867 abolished most criminal sanctions for a simple breach
of contract. Prime Minster Benjamin Disraeli described the e ect of the repealing Employers and Workmen
Act in the following terms: ‘for the rst time in the history of this country the employer and the employed
sit under equal laws. No one now can be imprisoned for breach of contract, while adequate civil remedies
58

have been furnished for this occasion.’

However, the civil regime that replaced the criminal regime did not

introduce contractual equality; magistrates continued to supervise the terms of the contract, require
speci c performance by the employee, and set o

p. 463

59

wages for breaches by the employee.

2. Canada (Ontario)
When it became unclear whether English master and servant laws applied in Upper Canada, which in 1867
would become the province of Ontario in the federal state of Canada, a local master and servant act was
60

enacted by the Legislative Assembly in 1847.

Originally designed speci cally to assist timber industry

employers in the Ottawa Valley to enforce labour contracts in a volatile labour market, the law also provided
61

a mechanism for workers to obtain wages owed by employers.

Like its UK counterpart, workers were

subject to criminal procedures and penalties, whereas employers faced only civil liability. In marked
contrast to its English forebear, however, workers claiming wages brought the overwhelming majority,
three-quarters, of cases heard between 1847 and the repeal of the penal provision in 1877. Ninety per cent of
these cases were successful to the extent that employers either settled or were required to pay, although
62

they were given time to do so and many simply failed to pay.

Of the cases brought by employers, the

majority were against absconding workers, and among the cases with a known outcome, the vast majority
of workers were convicted. However, workers convicted of desertion were rarely sentenced to imprisonment
(only 3 per cent), although a larger group (16 per cent in total) ended up in jail because they were unable to
63

pay the ne, which they, unlike employers, were required to do ‘forthwith’.

Wage claims and prosecutions for desertion tended to ebb and ow with the economy and industrial
con ict, the former increasing during recessions and the latter rising during periods of labour unrest and
64

trade union activity.

Workers’ success rates in wage claims tended to mirror the economy, increasing

during periods of recession, although over the entire period workers’ success rate dropped from 70 to 60 per
cent of cases. The opposite trend can be seen with regard to workers’ longer-term success in defending
against absconding and disobedience claims, which rose from about 25 per cent in the earlier period to
65

better than 50 per cent by 1876.

Unlike the UK, where only small numbers of claims under the master and servant laws were brought by
workers, in Ontario and Upper Canada, the opposite was true. Although workers brought the vast majority of
cases, as in the UK, there was a regional variation in the law’s use. In Toronto, the largest and most
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workers unable to pay nes. As James Davis, a noted stipendiary magistrate and author of a text on the

industrialized city, the years 1870 to 1873 saw the largest number of committals of workers under the
66

master and servant law.

It appears that in the early 1870s employers, following the example of their British
67

counterparts, used the law to respond to collective action by their workers.

During this period, marginal
68

manufacturers were more likely than their more successful confreres to resort to legal coercion.
p. 464

But, as

was the case in the UK, the use of master and servant law against trade unions and collective action
politicized the law. When the Ontario-based Canadian Labour Union

and the Toronto Trades Assembly

lobbied the Ontario legislature to repeal the penal provisions, the government declared it lacked authority to
do so. It was a criminal law, a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction under the British North America Act,
which established the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments.

Minister of Justice to follow suit, characterizing the o ending clause as against ‘[t]he modern spirit of the
69

law … ’

Hoping to bolster the legitimacy of his government after the Prime Minister’s controversial

intervention in a railway strike and to resolve a constitutional quirk, the federal Justice Minister introduced
a bill sharply limiting criminal breach of contract to breaches of employment contracts that were ‘wilful and
malicious’ and that caused harm to the public. Ordinary contract breaches by employees, which included
desertion and disobedience, were now under provincial law. While provincial master and servant acts could
70

make such breaches punishable, resulting in both nes and imprisonment, they were not true crimes.

In

any event, the law ended the formal inequality in the treatment of employers, who were subject to civil law,
71

and workers, who had been subject to criminal law.

In contrast to England, where the coercive aspects of master and servant law were instrumentally useful to
employers in many industries and locales to control labour mobility and discipline workers, in Ontario the
72

law had only a symbolic e ect, and even then the symbolism was attenuated.

While exemplary prosecution

could serve to reinforce the superior–subordinate relationship inscribed into the employment contract, its
too-frequent use could undermine the legitimacy of the contract of employment. Absent the long history of
patriarchal relations that was deeply embedded in English society and Canada’s proximity to the United
States where free labour was a rallying cry for white male workers, the use of penal law against workers but
73

not against masters was prima facie unjust.

Moreover, as we will see with the Ontario factory act, the

division of powers in the Canadian constitutions forced provincial and federal governments to be explicit
about the nature of penal laws in employment relations.

D. Factory Acts
1. UK
74

The struggle to achieve ‘the modest Magna Charta of a legally limited working day’

was an extended one

that involved ongoing debates over the scope of protection and the means of enforcement. Child labour and
p. 465

hours of work were the principal health and safety issues

of the rst industrial revolution because

pro tability depended on the absolute extraction of surplus value through the lengthening of the working
day and the employment of young children, especially in the textile industries of northern England. An early
source of child labour were the parish apprentices, who were often ruthlessly exploited by their mill-owner
masters, required to work up to fteen hours a day, and subjected to corporal punishment for
75

inattentiveness. Patriarchal control was near absolute.

Conditions were so appalling that they attracted the

attention of Manchester’s doctors and magistrates, and socially concerned elites. Sir Robert Peel’s
involvement as the sponsor of the rst factory act in 1802, the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act, was
arguably strategic, aimed at avoiding more radical measures harmful to his extensive manufacturing
76

interests.
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After the British government repealed its penal provisions in 1875, trade unionists urged the federal

The Act prohibited the apprentice children from working more than twelve hours a day or at night and
obliged employers to provide for their basic physical and moral well-being. The enforcement of these
requirements built on the criminal and local government jurisdiction of the justices of the peace who were
to appoint visitors to inspect the factories in their district and report on their ndings. The Act also made it
an o ence to obstruct a visitor or to ‘willfully act contrary to, or o end against, any of the provisions of this
Act’. Those convicted were subject to modest nes, half of which was paid to the informer. Prosecutions
commenced by an information and were conducted before two justices of the peace.
Over the next two decades, Parliament extended coverage of factory laws to free children, who had become
prohibited employment of children under the age of nine and night work for those under twenty-one, while
also limiting hours of work to twelve for those under sixteen (later raised to eighteen). Manufacturing
77

interests ercely resisted these laws, which were diluted to secure their passage.

There is widespread agreement that these laws went virtually unenforced. However, researchers have paid
little attention to the attempts by trade unionists to initiate prosecutions. This e ort took place in context of
spreading trade unionism among adult male textile workers in the early nineteenth century, often in ected
by popular radicalism embracing an alternative political economy based on the equalization of labour and
78

capital’s power.

A reduction in the hours of work would increase workers’ bargaining power and the

operatives formed short-time committees as early as 1814 with the initial goal of reducing the working
79

hours of children.

The short-time committees also pressed for improved enforcement. Led by trade

unionist John Doherty, they attempted to take matters into their own hands by pressing manufacturers to
p. 466

comply and, when that failed, seeking informants

whose evidence could support prosecutions. Although

Doherty and his associates obtained a few convictions, they faced ‘a bewildering variety of legal objections
and technicalities to frustrate them, a good deal of abuse both in court and in the press, and widespread
80

intimidation of witnesses on whom they depended’.

The situation did not improve even after an 1829
81

amendment that prevented the dismissal of cases for technical defects.

As Carson noted, ‘the question of

conventionalization was scarcely at issue. Employers could break the law at will without any real likelihood
82

of prosecution and without any substantial possibility of being adjudged criminal.’

The operatives’ agitation for stronger factory laws received a boost in the 1830s when Tory radicals such as
83

Michael Sadler, Richard Oastler, and John Fielden took up the cause.

Driven in part by abolitionism and
84

Anglicanism, and by con ict between old landed elites and an emerging industrial bourgeoisie,

Tory

radicals worked closely with the short-time committees, sometimes condemning mill owners’ actions as
85

criminal, rhetorically and at times literally.

Sadler proposed factory legislation to the Commons in March 1832. Political support for the measure had
86

grown, leading the government to delay by referring the bill to a Select Parliamentary Committee.

Oastler

pressed the case for criminal punishment:
I think it would be a very good thing, instead of having nes as the punishment for the breach of
the law, to make it imprisonment, and ogging and pillory; 1 have no doubt that would keep them
87

to it; I think that would be a most excellent thing.

The Sadler Committee provided a rare forum for the workers themselves to speak publicly of their embodied
88

experience.

Without expressly characterizing their employers’ behaviour as criminal, their descriptions of

the terrible conditions reinforced the narrative of the short-time committees and the Tory radicals that
‘white’ or ‘factory slavery’ was literally robbing workers of their property in their labour and their physical
89

and moral health.
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the largest group of children employed in cotton factories, often through family employment. The law

Lord Ashley became the legislative sponsor after Sadler’s 1832 election loss. In an e ort to take control of
the issue, the government established a Royal Commission to investigate factory conditions. The
Commission, dominated by Benthamite reformers, proceeded on a very di erent model than Sadler’s
Committee, more akin to a quasi-judicial investigation than a forum that provided workers with a platform
p. 467

to speak their truths. Not surprisingly,

it also produced a very di erent perspective on factory work, one

that defended the factory system while acknowledging the need to regulate the speci c problem of excessive
90

child labour.

The Commission did not see the problem as a criminal matter, but as one best addressed by
91

the creation of a system of government inspection.

there was a political contest over how to characterize violations of the law. Lord Ashley’s bill spoke of miller
owners’ ‘culpable negligence’ in failing to guard dangerous machinery and provided the occupier was to be
92

committed for trial for manslaughter at the ensuing Assizes if a child’s death resulted.

As well, if culpable

negligence resulted in grievous injury, the employer was liable to face a penalty between £50 and 200, to be
93

paid to the victim.

The Royal Commission’s report, however, criticized the Bill’s penal clauses (44) as

of a nature so vexatious and so arbitrary as, if sanctioned by the Legislature, would create a serious
objection to the investment of capital in manufacturing industry in this country.
Nor were the commissioners keen on criminal prosecution as a mode of enforcement. Rather, they
recommended the appointment of inspectors, vested with the power to enter factories that employed
children, a state intrusion into private space to be sure, but a far preferable alternative to hauling
manufacturers into the public space of the court.
Ashley’s bill was defeated after the release of the Commission’s report and the government passed its
94

measure, implementing the Commission’s recommendations.

The law clearly tilted away from a ‘true’

criminal law approach towards a regulatory one, including regulatory o ences. Employers who ‘o end
against any of the provisions of this Act’ were liable to be ned between £1 and 20 ‘[p]rovided nevertheless,
that if it shall appear to such Inspector or Justice that such O ence was not wilful nor grossly negligent,
such Inspector or Justice may mitigate such Penalty below the said sum of One Pound, or discharge the
95

Person charged with such O ence’.

As this clause indicates, the legislation did not fully resolve the juridical nature of violations of the Act,
leaving ambiguity about their criminal or regulatory character. The law created what we now characterize as
a strict liability o ence, where the crime is complete on proof of the actus reus, but it also provided for the
mitigation of penalty or complete discharge if the act was not wilful, thereby reintroducing a mental
element, to be applied at the discretion of the inspector or magistrate. Thus, we can see the government
feeling its way toward a resolution of the contradiction it faced. Child labour was widely recognized as
unacceptable, even for political economists who otherwise celebrated and defended market freedom, but so
too was the criminalization of the capitalists who bene ted from it.
p. 468

The law was deeply unsatisfactory to operatives and their political supporters for many reasons, one of
which was its failure to treat child labour as the crime they believed it to be. John Fielden, one of the Tory
radicals, wrote a pamphlet, ‘The Curse of the Factory System’ in which he argued:
[Just as] Parliament is distinctly told … it is part of their duty to make laws to protect men from the
arm of the murderer, laws of the same protecting kind are necessary in the case of these children,
where the murder is as certain as in any other instance, and more cruel, because the death is more
96

lingering.

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/36923/chapter/322198887 by York University Libraries user on 18 October 2022

While in retrospect the shift from crime to regulation is clear, the reality was messy and contested. First,

John Doherty also continued to press for stronger legislation based on the criminal law model that included
97

a penalty of ‘three months to the treadmill’ for third-time violators.

However, the push towards

98

criminalization failed and did not revive for over 150 years.

Once criminalization failed, the question of how the inspectors would enforce statutory o ences of an
ambiguous character arose. Robert Ricketts, one of the rst inspectors, provided an answer:
From the peculiar circumstances of this division, studded as it is with mills, where o ences and
evasions of the Act may be so easily committed with impunity, and where the impunity of one
culty of enforcing its

provisions was of no ordinary cast; and where dissatisfaction on the rst introduction of this Act
was so loudly and generally expressed, a discreet and conciliatory conduct on the part of the
inspector became as indispensable to the success of his proceeding as the powers vested in him by
99

the Act itself.

Inspectors did not view themselves as factory police on a mission to root out crime but rather as advisors
100

promoting compliance through education and persuasion.

The inspectors did not entirely abandon

prosecutions, but narrowly reserved them for the few wilful or reckless employers who outed law or
101

betrayed the trust of the inspector.

By introducing mens rea into their discretionary judgments, inspectors

e ectively carved out a small zone of ‘true’ criminality in a strict liability regime so that prosecutions were
reserved for only the most egregious cases of employer de ance of the law and of inspector authority. In the
102

result, most violations were tolerated or, in Carson’s terms, ‘conventionalized’.
p. 469

The ‘decriminalization’ of factory law and its transformation into regulatory ‘criminal’ law was perfected in
103

the legislation of 1844, which for the rst time regulated the employment of adult women in factories.

Section 41 provided that an occupier of a factory who violated the act was ‘deemed in the rst instance … to
have committed the o ence’, but allowed for a due diligence defence. The employer could defend himself by
‘prov[ing], to the satisfaction of the justices, that he had used due diligence to enforce the execution of the
Act’ and that an agent, servant or workman had committed the o ence ‘without his knowledge, consent, or
connivance’. In e ect, the legislation refashioned factory act violations as modern strict liability o ences,
complete upon proof of the act, to which a defence of due diligence was available. This technique enabled
the British state to respond to the harmful consequences of the rst industrial revolution without truly
criminalizing those who were responsible.
This was the law on the books, but the question of how inspectors exercise their enforcement discretion
remained to be determined. Cleansed of the taint of ‘real crime’, inspectors could have chosen to step up
their use of prosecutions and, indeed, there was a small spike in prosecutions in 1845 and 1846. However,
104

their enthusiasm quickly waned and from 1847 prosecutions were rare.

Inspectors’ strongly preferred

persuasion and conciliation, reserving prosecution only for the most de ant employers. In the end,
regulatory o ences, too, were conventionalized and prosecutions were reserved for those who de ed the
authority of the state, not those who simply violated workers’ rights, thus bringing law enforcement back
within the traditional criminal domain of defending state order.
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transgressor is an inducement to many others to follow his example, the di

2. Canada (Ontario)
The Canadian story of factory legislation begins in the 1870s at the time of Canada’s much later industrial
105

revolution.

While industry tended to cluster in major urban centres there were pockets in some smaller

cities. One of these was Cornwall, which attracted a large number of textile manufacturers, and its Member
of Parliament, Dr Darby Bergin, cloaked in the mantle of Tory radicalism, launched a lonely crusade for
factory legislation in 1879. Despite initial failure, Bergin persisted and his later e orts attracted support
from a renascent labour movement, leading to the appointment of a commission of inquiry in 1881. Its
report, issued in January 1882, found the employment of children and women working long hours was
in many factories. The government introduced a factory bill in the Senate in April 1882 where, for the rst
106

time, the question of the federal parliament’s jurisdiction was raised.

As noted previously, under the

British North America Act (BNAA), the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law. It
also has a more general power to legislate for ‘peace, order and good government of Canada’ (POGG), while
p. 470

the

107

provinces have jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

Sir Alexander Campbell, the federal

Minister of Justice, defended the government’s measure under its POGG power, not as criminal law.
It is because this bill relates to subjects so important as that, subjects which go far beyond
contracts between master and servant, which in their indirect e ects concern the whole
community, and on which, to a certain extent … the future of the country very much turns—
whether we shall have a strong, healthy and moral population, likely to be creditable to the country
… I say if these subjects do not a ect the peace, order and welfare of the whole community it would
108

be hard to say what does.

The government subsequently withdrew the bill in the face of vigorous opposition from the manufacturers.
109

Another bill introduced the following year, met the same fate.

The failure of the Dominion Conservative government to act left a political space for the Ontario Liberal
government to pursue its expansive view of provincial jurisdiction and to consolidate support among
working-class voters. In 1884, it enacted the Ontario Factories’ Act, which borrowed heavily from the UK
legislation, including its penalty provision. Contraventions of the act were summary conviction o ences
punishable by a ne up to $50, and in default of payment a gaol sentence of up to three months. However,
the Act also provided that the employer could escape conviction by showing that despite due diligence
110

another person not under the employer’s control was responsible for the violation.

The BNAA explicitly empowered provinces to impose these kinds of penalties for non-criminal regulatory
111

o ences provided it was legislating within its powers.

The constitutional question was whether factory

law was a matter of ‘property and civil rights in the province’ or a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
The answer to the question was not obvious and the province did not immediately declare the Act in force,
providing Darby Bergin with an opportunity to reintroduce his federal factory act in 1885. He emphasized
the protection of children;
their health, their life, their faith and their morals are at stake, and they ask us to given them all
the aid and all the assistance which it is in the power of this Parliament to give … that the factory
boy may grow up strong and vigorous … a good citizen and a valuable member of society; that the
factory girl may grow up an intelligent and a virtuous woman, a true wife and a loving mother of
healthy children … that they may … not be killed through over work … that they may not , through
cupidity on the part of their masters, be maimed or crippled for life by machinery … that they may
not become victims of the moloch gold, as was the case in England … these are among the objects
112

of this Bill.
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widespread. It also found dangerous machinery, inadequate ventilation, and unsanitary conditions present

p. 471

Given this characterization of the harm employers were causing, the bill arguably fell within the federal
government’s criminal law powers. David Mills, a Liberal member of Parliament from Ontario and a
respected constitutional law expert (who had been retained by the Ontario government to assist in an
anticipated Factory Act reference), however, challenged this characterization. He drew a sharp distinction
between ‘police powers’ and the federal government’s criminal law powers.
All those regulations which a community nd it necessary to make in order to prevent one man
from interfering with the comfort and well-being of another in the use of that freedom which the
law allows him are police regulations, and are part of that department of jurisprudence embraced

… Criminal law in section 91 of the British North America Act … embraces those wrongs committed
against society which are in themselves bad, and which are prosecuted and punished in the name
of the Sovereign. It was never intended to embrace within the limits of the criminal law … those
police and municipal regulations which are established for the purpose of promoting morality,
113

decency and good health.

From Mills’ generally laissez-faire perspective, the law ‘propose[s] to deal with the relations between the
114

employer and the employed … It interferes with the freedom of contract.’

Real crimes were not being

committed here, although he recognized that the constitution empowered the provinces to punish those
115

who violate police regulation, which he described as ‘Provincial Criminal Law’.

The issue came up again three years later in the context of a debate over funding for a Royal Commission
116

into relations between labour and capital.

The Commission heard evidence of factory children in Montreal

working fourteen-hour days, leading one Member of Parliament, Richard Cartwright, to compare their
conditions as ‘in no degree removed from white slavery’ and to call for ‘our criminal law … to be amended,
and most stringent penalties should be in icted not merely on the overseers and the factory hands, but on
117

the responsible directors, or at least on some of those who are managers’.

George Casey, another Member

of Parliament, agreed: ‘if we cannot declare such acts’ as ‘killing children by compelling them to perform
inordinate labor’ or ‘assaulting and ogging half grown up girls’ to be ‘criminal, we cannot declare any
118

o ence against the person to be criminal, whether it is committed inside or outside of a factory’.

David

Mills opposed the demand for sti er penalties. While admitting that ‘it is not easy to draw the line where
police regulation ends and where ordinary criminal regulation begins’, and conceding that in some cases,
such as ‘ og[ging] children inordinately’ the criminal law might apply, he insisted that legislation touching
on working conditions was a matter of police regulation within provincial jurisdiction. The Minister of
119

p. 472

Justice, John Thompson agreed and no action followed,

ending political debates over the use of
120

criminal law to protect the health and safety of workers for almost 100 years.

What then of the enforcement of ‘Provincial Criminal Law’? Apart from Mills’ use of the term, this
characterization of regulatory o ences never gained legal or popular purchase. Even though regulatory
o ences sometimes are referred to as ‘quasi-criminal’, almost no criminal taint attaches to those convicted.
Notionally, as in the UK, because the law lacked the moral connotation associated with real crime and was
legally constructed as a strict liability o ence subject to a due diligence defence, Ontario’s factory inspectors
might have felt freer to prosecute employers who violated the law. Nevertheless, as in the UK, the factory
inspectors adopted the view that resort to prosecution was only to occur after persuasion had clearly failed.
In e ect, the inspectors read a mental element into their discretionary judgements about when to prosecute
a strict liability o ence. Wilful disobedience or de ance of the inspectors’ authority was generally required,
and even then prosecutions were rarely pursued. As in England, violations of police regulation were
conventionalized.
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with the division, designated— ‘Property and Civil Rights.’

E. Conclusion
Putting criminal law to work in the construction of disciplinary and protective labour regimes in the early
nineteenth century followed two di erent trajectories but converged over the course of the century around
the view that employment relations were private matters of contract law, and not a concern of public order
and ‘true’ crimes. Master and servant law was available in England as a legal and cultural foundation upon
which to reconstruct disciplinary authority in the rst stages of the industrial revolution, but not all masters
needed or could easily mobilize the criminal law to discipline their workers. Parliament was not averse to
beauty of freedom of contract and, for the most part, local legal institutions did not balk at putting the
criminal law to work. Workers were eventually able to throw o

the yoke of criminal master and servant

law, but that happened remarkably late in the development of the so-called free labour market, the ‘very
121

Eden of the innate rights of man’ where ‘[t] here alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham’.

In Canada, on the other hand, the master and servant regime’s roots were much shallower. By the time of its
industrial revolution in the second half of the nineteenth century reliance on the criminal law to discipline
the new industrial working class lacked widely shared legitimacy. In any event, by that time employers were
actively developing other labour control strategies less directly dependent on law and the state.
When it came to building protective labour rights, most politicians were loath to criminalize employers who
ruthlessly exploited child labour and extended hours of work for all at the expense of their lives and health.
This was manifestly the result of freedom of contract. As Marx observed ironically, ‘The contract by which
he sold to the capitalist his labour-power proved, so to say, in black and white that he disposed of himself
p. 473

122

freely.’

Thus, protection was a violation of freedom of contract. While legislators could ignore the

reality of the massive inequality between workers dependent on owners of capital to secure subsistence, it
was more di

cult to justify children’s or women’s working conditions as the result of a free exchange

between juridical equals. These vulnerable workers were deserving of a measure of protection, provided it
did not impinge too greatly on employer pro ts and did not criminalize the employing class. The challenge,
therefore, was to construct protection without stigmatizing employers as criminals at a time when criminal
law was one of the few legal technologies available to the state. Out of this tension weakly enforced
regulatory law was born.
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